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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1982, Congress enacted section 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code as
part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA).' Section 7430
provides an award of attorney's fees and reasonable litigation costs to prevailing
tax litigants who encounter unreasonable conduct by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 2 The provision attempts to deter abusive conduct and overreaching
by the IRS.3 Section 7430 addresses difficulties in prior legislative attempts to
4
compensate taxpayers confronting nonmeritorious government claims.
A troublesome dichotomy remains over whether the provision's language
encompasses the IRS's pre-litigation conduct or only its actual litigation pos1. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 572 (1982)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. S 7430 (1982)).
2. I.R.C. S 7430(a), (c) (West Supp. 1985).
3. H.R. REP. No. 404, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1982).
4.
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAxATiON, 97TH CONG., 2D Sass., DESCRIrTIoN OF LAW AND
BILLS RELATING TO AWARDS OF ATrORNEY's FEES IN TAX CASES 5 (1981).
1013
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ture.' Congress failed to prescribe the "position" courts must examine for a
finding of unreasonableness.' Some courts award fees only for unreasonable IRS
litigation behavior;7 others provide compensation whenever unreasonable government action forces a private party into court.' Unreasonable IRS conduct
during the administrative stages of a proceeding should trigger section 7430's
award of litigation costs to compensate victimized taxpayers.
This Note will examine both legal and pragmatic ramifications of the Code's
provision for fee-shifting in tax litigation. The history of cost awards and the
mechanical requirements of section 7430 will be considered. Various federal
court positions and the underlying policy considerations for them will be examined. Finally, this Note will advocate adoption of the "underlying action"
theory for the award of reasonable litigation costs in suits with the IRS.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A.

OF THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES

American Rule

Prior to TEFRA, a taxpayer's legal basis for obtaining awards of attorney's
fees and litigation costs was tenuous. Under the common law "American Rule,"
litigants assumed the financial obligations of their lawsuits." The doctrine of
sovereign immunity further protected the government from awards of fees and
costs to prevailing taxpayers.' Federal courts exercised equitable power to award
costs in two limited situations: when an opposing party acted in bad faith,

5. See infra notes 71-147 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 110-47 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 71-109 and accompanying text.
9. The American Rule was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Arcambel v. Wiseman,
3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 306 (1796). In Arcambel, the Court denied attorney's fees to the prevailing party
on the premise that "[tihe general practice of the United States is in opposition to it; and even
if that practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till
it is changed, or modified, by statute." 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 306.
The principle theory behind the Rule dictates that the poor should not be deterred from
litigating by the possibility of liability for their opponents' attorney's fees. See Fleischmann Distilling
Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-18 (1967); Robertson & Fowler, Recovering Attorneys'
Fees from the Government Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 56 TUL. L. REv. 903, 909 (1982) (poor
should not be discouraged from participating in litigation).
Despite criticism, the American Rule has generally withstood the test of time. See, e.g., Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); F.D. Rich Co. v. United States,
417 U.S. 116 (1974); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
See generally Falcon, Award of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional Litigation, 33 MD.
L. REv. 379, 379-419 (1973) (justifications and criticisms of American Rule); Comment, Court
Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636 (1974) (detailed
discussion of American Rule).
10. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 267-68 n.42 (1975)
("a sovereign is not liable for costs unless specific provision for such liability is made by law"
(quoting the Reviser to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1946)); Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, aff'd,
78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) j 9834, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). See generally Cohen, Awards
of Attorneys' Fees Against the United States: The Sovereign Is Still Somewhat Immune, 2 W. NEw ENG. L.
REv. 177, 181-82 (1979) (discussing the sovereign immunity defense to attorney's fees liability).
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vexatiously, or for oppressive reasons;" and when a prevailing litigant conferred
a common benefit on an ascertainable group of persons.' 2 In addition, prior
to 1975, the "private attorney general" theory provided fee awards when a
suit ultimately vindicated important societal rights.' 3 In Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Wilderness Society,' 4 the Supreme Court abridged the law of fee-shifting.
The Court eliminated the private attorney general doctrine and confined awards,
absent express statutory' 5 or contractual authorization, to the original common
6
law exceptions to the American Rule.'
B.

Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act

In 1976, Congress responded to Alyeska by passing the Civil Rights Attor-

11. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); Lipsig v. National Student
Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
12. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
393-94 (1970); Jesser v. Mayfair Hotel, Inc., 360 S.W. 2d 652, 662-63 (Mo. 1962); see also Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. -Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 264-65 n.39 (1975) (exception limited to
small and easily identifiable class of beneficiaries). See generally Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert
Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1222, 1233-37 (1973) (common benefit
exception is inapplicable to tax litigation with the IRS).
13. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam)
(first articulation of private attorney general exception); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 60406 (5th Cir. 1974) (reapportionment action pursuant to Voting Rights Act of 1965); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973) (private litigant's action against
EPA to force compliance with Clean Air Amendments of 1970); Lee v. Southern Homes Sites
Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1971) (housing discrimination suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S
1982 (1970). See generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV.
L. REv. 849, 888-907 (1975) (discussing private attorney general case law); Comment, supra note
9, at 665-81 (discussing private attorney general exception); Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the
"Private Attorney General;" Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS
L.J. 733 (1973) (extensive discussion of theory).
14. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
15. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. S 552(a)(4)(E) (1976); Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. S 552a (g)(2)(B), (3)(B), (4); Federal Water Polution Control Act Amendments of
1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C.
S 14 15 (g)( 4 ); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. S 4911(d) (1976); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(b) (Supp. I 1977). Congress authorized more exceptions after Alyeska. See, e.g., Ethics in
Government Act of 1978, 2 U.S.C. § 288(d) (Supp. I 1978); Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,
12 U.S.C. S 5596(b)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. 11 1978); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C.
S 3417(a)(4) (Supp. 11 1978); Tax Reform Act of 1976, 26 U.S.C. S 6110(i)(2)(B) (1976); Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (Supp. 1 1977).
16. The Supreme Court rejected the District of Columbia Circuit's award of nonstatutory
fees under the private attorney general doctrine, Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), concluding:
[C]ongressional utilization of the private-attorney-general concept can in no sense be construed as a grant of authority to the Judiciary to jettison the traditional rule against
nonstatutory allowance to the prevailing party and to award attorneys' fees whenever the
courts deem the public policy furthered by a particular statute important enough to warrant
the award.
421 U.S. at 263. The court thus limited fee-shifting to the common fund and bad faith exceptions.
421 U.S. at 247-69; see Oakes, Introduction: A Brief Glance at Attorneys' Fees After Alyeska, 2 W. NEW
ENG. L. Ray. 169, 173 (1979).
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ney's Fees Awards Act. 7 The Act gave courts discretionary authority to award
fees to prevailing parties in civil tax suits involving enforcement of the Code.",
Because the Act limited fee-shifting to tax litigation brought "by or on behalf"
of the United States,' private tax plaintiffs still lacked an avenue for redress."'
Courts frequently adopted the standards of bad faith, vexatiousness or harassment as prerequisites to recovery. 2 ' Few taxpayers, however, obtained fee
awards.2 2 The absence of a private remedy in the Attorney's Fees Awards Act
generated remedial legislation.
C.

Equal Access to Justice Act

The enactment of the Equal Access to Justice Act"' (EAJA) in 1980 improved
taxpayers' prospects for recovering litigation costs. 2 4 EAJA awarded fees and
costs to prevailing private parties in civil actions brought by or against the
United States.2' The Act precluded compensation to taxpayers when the position
of the United States was substantially justified or special circumstances made
an award unjust.26 To be eligible for an award of costs, moreover, taxpayers

17. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641
(1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981)); see S. REP. No. 1011, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976).
18. Before the Equal Access to Justice Act Amendments, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976 provided:
[1In any civil action or proceedings, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to
enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue
Code of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, reasonable attorney's fees as a part of
the costs.
42 U.S.C. 5 1988 (1976).
19.
Id.
20. See, e.g., Key Buick Co. v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 1306, 1308 (5th Cir. 1980) (requiring
that government initiate litigation for taxpayer to be eligible for fee award).
21. See, e.g., Patzkowski v. United States, 576 F.2d 134, 139 (8th Cir. 1978) (discussing
requirement of subjective bad faith by the government); Haskin v. United States, 444 F. Supp.
299, 304 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (discussing government's suit commenced in frivolous or harassing
manner); In re Kline, 429 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (D. Md. 1977) (court precluded fee-shifting despite
government's knowledge of its "meritless" position); United States v. Garrison Constr. Co., 772 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9705, at 88,389 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (court adopted less stringent standard
of "vexatious or harassing treatment not amounting to bad faith").
22. Only twice in two years were attorney's fees awarded. Note, Taxpayers and the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 20 B.C.L. REV. 539, 553 (1979); cf. In re Slodov, 79-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH)
9215, at 86,414 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (IRS's failure to honor prior agreement
constituted bad faith); United States v. Garrison Constr. Co., 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9705
(N.D. Ala. 1977) (IRS's failure to inspect taxpayer's records before suit was unreasonable).
23. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 2412, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. 1983)).
24. Robertson & Fowler, supra note 9, at 903 (the Act "significantly increases the opportunities
for small businesses, charitable organizations and other parties involved in court or agency litigation
with the federal government to recoup their attorney's fees and other litigation expenses").
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (Supp. 1983).
26. The relevant portion of EAJA provided:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing
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27
had to satisfy maximum net worth and business size limitations.
Despite the modifications advanced by EAJA, fee-shifting in favor of prevailing tax litigants rarely occurred. 28 Based on statutory construction, 29 the
20
federal judiciary denied EAJA's applicability to the United States Tax Court.
Because the vast majority of tax litigation occurred in Tax Court, few taxpayers
successfully obtained fee awards.2 1 Congress then intervened in 1982 by enacting
section 7430.

III.

THE OPERATION OF

A.

I.R.G. § 7430

Section 7430 Generally

Section 7430 awards reasonable litigation costs of up to $25,000 to taxpayers
prevailing in civil tax actions in which the IRS assumed an unreasonable position.2 2 The provision explicitly displaces EAJA's application to tax litigation

party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded
pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases
sounding in tort) brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction
of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. S 2412(d)(1)(a) (1982). Legislative history makes it clear that the government bears the
burden of proving its position was substantially justified. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1980). See generally Note, Will the Sun Rise Again for the Equal Access to justice Act?, 48
BROOKLYN L. REV. 265, 285 (1982) (discussing the burden of proving "substantial justification").
27. See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, 5 202(a), 94 Stat. at 2325
(1980); Robertson & Fowler, supra note 9, at 905 ("the Act is not intended to benefit parties with
unlimited resources, but only those for whom financial considerations may be a significant deterrent
to pursuing litigation").
The parties eligible for fee awards include: "[I]ndividuals with $1 million or less in net worth;
businesses and piblic or private organizations with less than 501 employees and no more than $5
million in net worth; tax-exempt organizations (I.R.C. S 501(c)(3) (West Supp. 1985)) with less
than 501 employees; and agricultural cooperatives with less than 501 employees." Robertson &
Fowler, supra note 9, at 905-06.
28. See Note, Tax Litigation and Attorney's Fees: Still a Win-Lose Dichotomy, 57 S. CAL. L. REV.
471, 479 (1984); Attorney Fee Awards - Has Me Bell Tolled Under the New Law?, [1982] 10 Stand.
8375, at 8377.
Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
29. EAJA applies only to courts created under article III of the United States Constitution;
the Tax Court was created under article I, section 8, clause 9. Note, Award of Attorney Fees in Tax
Litigation, 19 VAL. U.L. REV. 153, 156 (1984).
30. See, e.g., Bowen v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1087 (lth Cir. 1983); McQuiston v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 807, 811 (1982); Benson v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. 672, 673 (1983).
31. See Commissioner's Annual Report Emphasizes Compliance Problems, [1982] 10 Stand. Fed. Tax
Rep, (CCH) 8324, at 8327 (discussing statistics of the Tax Court's dominance over tax decisions);
Mandelkern, Recovering Attorney's Fees in Tax Court Cases After TEFRA, 57 FLA. B.J. 707 (1983).
32. I.R.C. § 7430(a), (b)(1), (c)(2) (West Supp. 1985). I.R.C. S 7430(a)(1), (2) (West Supp.
1985) provide:
(a) In general-In the case of any civil proceeding which is(1) brought by or against the United States in connection with the determination,
collection, or refund of any tax, interest, or penalty under this tide, and
(2) brought in a court of the United States (including the Tax Court and the United
States Claim Court), the prevailing party may be awarded a judgment for reasonable
litigation costs incurred in such proceeding.
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initiated after February 28, 1983.33 Any party, other than the United States or
the taxpayer's creditors, who is involved in suits relating to the collection or
refund of any tax, interest, or penalty imposed by the Code is eligible for

recompense .31
Section 7430 alters the coverage provided by EAJA in four principal respects.
First, section 7430 provides for reimbursement in Tax Court proceedings.',
Second, section 7430 effectively shifts the burden of proof to establish the character of the government's position from the government to the taxpayer.3 6 Third,
the provision alters the nature of the requisite standard in attorney's fee litigation. 37 Following a taxpayer's initiation of a suit for costs, EAJA required
the government to establish the affirmative defense of "substantial justification."'" Section 7430 now requires prevailing taxpayers to prove the unreasonableness of the government's position.3 9 Finally, the new enactment mandates
that otherwise eligible taxpayers exhaust their administrative remedies before
resorting to litigation.4 0 EAJA generally provided for reasonable litigation awards
absent such a requirement."

B.

Meclunical Requirements of I.R.C. § 7430

1.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

To be eligible for an award of attorney's fees and costs under section 7430,
a taxpayer must first exhaust all available administrative remedies within the
IRS. 42 Inherent in this procedure is the taxpayer's participation in the proceedings and his responsibility to disclose all relevant information.4 3 These good-

33.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(e) (1981). Section 292(c) of TEFRA provides:
Application of Title 28-Section 2412 of Title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(e) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any costs, fees, and other expenses
in connection with any proceeding to which section 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 applies ...."
See McQuiston v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 807, 811 (1982); Jenny v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M.
440, 455 n.16 (1983).
34. I.R.C. S 7430(a)(1), (c)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985).

35. I.R.C. S 7430(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
36. Pursuant to I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1985), the taxpayer must establish the
government's position was unreasonable. See S. REP. No. 530, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 687 (1982);
127 CONG. REc. S 15594 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981). Under the EAJA, the Government must prove
its action was substantially justified. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 36.
38. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
39. I.R.C. S 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1985); see infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
40. I.R.C. § 7430(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985); see infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
41. 28 U.S.C. S 2412(d)(1)(B) (Supp. I 1983).
42. I.R.C. § 7430(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
43. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-I(b)(2) (1984) provides that a party participates in the conference
"if the party or qualified representative discloses to the Appeals office all relevant information
regarding the party's tax matter to the extent such information and its relevance were known or
should have been known to the party or qualified representative at the time of such conference."
See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
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faith requirements promote pre-trial dispute resolution and help avoid the costs
44
of actual litigation.
IRS regulations prescribe procedures which satisfy the exhaustion of remedies
prerequisites. 45 Absent exceptions permitting a bypass of the administrative process,4 taxpayers must: (a) request an Appeals office conference; 47 (b) file a written
protest if required; 4" (c) agree to extend the time for potential assessments when
the Appeals office must consider the tax matter; 49 and (d) participate in the
Appeals office conference if granted. 50 In addition to setting forth the framework
for completing administrative prerequisites, the regulations provide illustrations
of the applicable rules and exceptions. 5' The only aspect of section 7430 addressed in the regulations remains this exhaustion of administrative remedies
5 2
requirement.
2.

Prevailing Party

To qualify for fee-shifting, a taxpayer must be a "prevailing party" as
defined in section 7430.53 The taxpayer must have "substantially prevailed" as
to the amount in controversy 4 or as to the most significant issue or set of
issues involved.5 5 In the absence of an agreement by the parties, the court
determines the prevailing party.5 6 A taxpayer generally prevails by definition
upon a showing of the government's unreasonableness' 5 7 When a case has not
been brought in court, however, complications in the determination of the prevailing party may arise. The EAJA's defimition of the term "prevailing" en-

44.
IST SEss.,

HOUSE

REPORT,

supra note 3, at 13;

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,

97TH CONG.,

DESCRIPTION OF LAWS AND BILLS RELATING TO AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN TAX

4 (Comm. Print 1981); see Mandelkern, supra note 31, at 708.
45. Treas. Reg. S 301.7430-1 (1984).
46. Id. S 301.7430-Q(0()-(4).
47. Id. S 301.7430-1(b)(ii)(A).
48. Id. S 301.7430-1(b)(ii)(B).
49. Id. S 301.7430-1(b)(ii)(C).
50. Id. S 301.7430-1(b)(2). Different procedures govern revocation of charitable organization
status. See I.R.C. S 501(c)(3) (West Supp. 1985). In attempting to establish one's organization as
a charitable organization, a party must exhaust all administrative remedies pursuant to I.R.C. S
7428. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-1(c) (1984).
Actions involving summonses, levies, liens, jeopardy and termination assesments are governed by
Treas. Reg. S 301.7430-1(d), which prescribes that a party must submit a written claim to the
district director specifying the surrounding circumstances and nature of the requested relief. After
the district director has either denied the claim in writing or failed to respond within a reasonable
period, administrative remedies are considered exhausted.
51. Treas. Reg. S 301.7430-1(g) (1984) provides twelve examples illustrating operation of the
exhaustion of remedies requirement.
52. Rubin, Report on TEFRA Provisions with Respect to Award of Litigation Costs to Taxpayers and
Increased Damages to the Government, 62 TAXES 381, 384 (1984) ("it is understood that the IRS does
not expect to issue regulations dealing with other aspects of Section 7430").
53. I.R.C. 5 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1985).
54. Id. S 7430(c)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
55. Id. S 7430(c)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
56. Id. S 7430(c)(2)(B).
57. Id. S 7430(c)(2)(A)(i); see Note, supra note 28, at 489.
CASES
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compassed settlement negotiations, voluntary dismissals and pre-trial motions.5 8
5 9
Presumably, Congress intended section 7430 to include these same actions.
3.

Unreasonableness

The principal barrier in a taxpayer's attempt to effectuate fee-shifting remains establishing the unreasonableness of the government's position.6" Rather
than articulate a determinative test for unreasonableness, Congress enumerated
the following criteria to be evaluated in conjunction with legal precedent and
the facts in a given case:
(1) whether the Government used the costs and expenses of litigation
against its position to extract concessions from the taxpayer that were
not justified under the circumstances of the case, (2) whether the Government pursued the litigation against the taxpayer for purposes of harassment or embarrassment, or out of political
motivation, and (3) such
6
other factors as the court finds relevant. '
Thus, the government's pursuit of a meritless legal position constitutes incontrovertible unreasonableness, 62 whereas the assumption of a substantively viable
position does not. 63 Likewise, an effort by the IRS to sustain a position in a
circuit which previously held for the taxpayer on the same issue would represent
a paradigmatic example of unreasonableness. 64 By contrast, the IRS's attempt
to create a conflict among United States Circuit Courts of Appeals is not
unreasonable.

6

4.

Reasonable Litigation Costs

If, in the court's discretion, 66 a taxpayer qualifies for recoverable fees and
costs, the reasonable litigation costs would include: (a) court costs; (b) expenses
of expert witnesses relating to the proceedings; (c) the cost of any study, analysis,
or report which the court finds necessary for preparing the case; and (d) attorney's fees in connection with the proceeding. 67 Congress, however, imposed

58.
Fund v.
348, 351
59.
60.
61.
62.

H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980); see Environmental Defense
Watt, 554 F. Supp. 36, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Photo Data, Inc. v. Sawyer, 533 F. Supp.
(D.D.C. 1982).
See Mandelkern, supra note 31, at 708.
I.R.C. S 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1985); see Note, supra note 28, at 482-83.
H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 3, at 12.
See Note, supra note 28, at 486 ("courts may award attorney's fees for governmental
procedural abuse alone").
63. See generally Rubin, supra note 54, at 381-87 (discussing what is "unreasonable").
64. See Ashburn v. United States, 740 F.2d 843 (11th Cir. 1984) (EAJA decision where
government had taken the same position many times previously without ever having succeeded).
65. H.R. REP. No. 404, supia note 3, at 12. See Ellentuck, Holub & Solomon, Attorneys' Fees
Awards in Tax Litigation Now Available to Successful Litigants, 46 J. TAX'N 157 (1977).
66. I.R.C. § 7430(a) (West Supp. 1985) provides that a party "may" be awarded reasonable
litigation costs.
67. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(1)(A), (B) (West Supp. 1985).
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limits on the Code's fee-shifting provisions. 68 In addition to a $25,000 ceiling
on the award of reasonable litigation costs, 69 the expenses are compensable only
to the extent they are allocable to the United States and not to another party
70
to the proceeding.
IV.

UNDERLYING ACTION V.

A.

LITIGATION POSITION

Section 7430

One of the most litigated legal issues in the scheme of fee-shifting is the
breadth of "the position of the United States ' 7 ' in the determination of unreasonableness. 72 Federal courts disagree over whether an award of fees extends
to the government's unjustified conduct in the entire dispute or merely to
government actions subsequent to the filipg of the suit. 73 The discord results
from section 7430's failure to specify whether the term "position" refers to the
74
government's conduct precipitating the suit or its conduct during litigation.
The legislative history of section 7430 provides only limited assistance in in75
terpreting the provision.
1.

Underlying Action Theory

Only -two federal courts of appeals have directly addressed the scope of

68. Id. S 7430(b). In addition, courts may attempt to apportion fee awards when a taxpayer
only partially prevails. See Note, supra note 28, at 491 n.145.
69. I.R.C. S 7430(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985). TEFRA's approach differs from EAJA, in which
eligibility was contingent upon net worth and size limitations, and eligible parties could generally
recover all of their attorney's fees. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. In any event, both
provisions attempt to serve parties likely to be deterred from litigation because of costs. See 127
CoNo. RFa. H 9617 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1981).
70. I.R.C. S 7430(b)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
71. Id. S 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1985).
72. See infra notes 73-185 and accompanying text.
73. See Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1985) ("civil proceeding" includes prelitigation activities); Sharpe v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 4,7 (E.D. Va. 1984); cf. Penner v.
United States, 584 F. Supp. 1582 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Hallam v. Murphy, 586 F. Supp. 1,3 (N.D.
Ga. 1983). But see United States v. Balanced Fin. Mgmt., Inc., 769 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1985)
("civil procdeding" precludes pre-litigation activities); Contini v. United Sfates, 84-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH)
9969 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Brazil v. United States, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9596 (D. Or. 1984); Zielinski v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9514 (D. Minn.
1984); Eidson v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9182 (N.D. Ala. 1984); Baker v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C. 822 (1984); Spirtis v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 610 (1985); Powell
v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 323 (1985).
74. I.R.C. 5 7430(c)(3) (West Supp. 1985) merely provides that "civil proceeding" includes
a civil action.
75. H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 3, at 12; see Note, Attorney's Fees in Tax Cases After the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 36 TAX LAw. 123, 152 (1982) ("neither the language
of the Act nor the legislative history indicates conclusively whether the term "government's position'
refers to the government's litigation position or to its conduct and actions generally in the course
of the civil proceeding"); Mandelkern, supra note 31 ("it is unclear from the legislative history
whether the 'position of the United States in the civil proceeding' means its position in the litigation
or its position during the taxpayer's audit and administrative appeal").
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section 7430's coverage. In Kaufman v. Egger,76 the First Circuit Court of Appeals
held that section 7430's award of costs encompassed pre-litigation conduct by
the IRS.77 The court awarded attorney's fees and litigation costs to taxpayers
victimized by bureaucratic "bungling. ' 7' The taxpayers in Kaufman filed their
1978 individual income tax return early in 1979." Subsequently, they moved
from their Illinois residence to Maine."' In 1980, the IRS sent an audit notice
to their former Illinois address." That same year, the IRS mailed a statutory
notice of deficiency and an increased tax liability assessment to a separate Illinois
address where the taxpayers never resided.12 Upon discovering the mistakes in
1983, the IRS seized a refund as partial payment of over $23,000 in back
taxes."" The taxpayers instituted an action seeking a temporary restraining order. "4
In response, the IRS stipulated to the permanent injunction, preventing any
further action on collection of the deficiency. "' The district court subsequently
awarded attorney's fees and litigation costs to the taxpayers."'
Affirming the district court's award, the circuit court in Kaufman analyzed
the several prerequisites to the successful application of section 7430. In response
to the IRS's contention that the taxpayer failed to exhaust available administrative remedies,87 the court found the taxpayer's immediate resort to litigation
permissible given the government's intrinsic unreasonableness. 8 The court relied
on section 7430's legislative history 9 and the regulations addressing the exhaustion of remedies requirement. y"

76. 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985).
77. Id. at 4. The other court of appeals confined I.R.C. § 7430's coverage to the government's
litigation position. See infra notes 138-150 and accompanying text.
78. Id. at 2. "The present case zeros in on one of many unnecessary tribulations that can
be brought to bear upon the unsuspecting citizenry by today's computerized bureaucracy." Id. at
1.

79. Id.at 2.
80. Id.
81. Id. The IRS Chicago office, where the Kaufmans filed their 1978 tax return, had in its
file an IRS "Transcript of Account" indicating the Kaufmans' correct address in Maine. Due to
the Kaufmans' absence from the audit, their tax liability increased by $14,380.
82. Id. The address was that of another couple by the same name. The IRS acknowledged
its mistake in a memo placed in the Kaufmans' file eleven days later. In the interim, the IRS
was corresponding with the Kaufmans at their Maine address about other matters.
83. Id. This was the first notification the Kaufmans received regarding the deficiencies. By
this time, the Taxpayers Delinquent Account section had taken over.
84. Id.

85.

Id.

86. 548 F. Supp. 872 (D. Me. 1984).
87. The IRS claimed the Kaufmans should have attempted to correct the 1978 deficiency at
the agency level. Id. at 3.
88.
"[T~he Kaufmans can hardly be faulted for seeking immediate judicial relief." Id.
89. H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 3, at 13; STAFF OF SENATE COMM. OF FINANCE: TECHNICAL
EXPLANATIONS OF COMMITTEE AMENDMENT, reprintedin 127 CONG. REc. S 15,559 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as TECHNtCAL EXPL,%NATION] (taxpayers must exaust administraive remedies unless the
court determines the case does not warrant such requirement).
90. Pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-1(F)(3)(ii) (1984), the IRS considers administrative
appeals exhausted when the party
[did not receive a preliminary notice of proposed disallowance prior to issuance of a
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The government also contended that "the position of the United States in
the civil proceeding" 9' referred only to litigation-related proceedings occurring
after the initiation of a sUit.92 The Kauifinan court acknowledged the division of
authority in cases directly addressing the issue93 but ultimately rejected the
government's position. The court relied on congressional committee reports suggesting the prevailing taxpayer should obtain fees in civil tax actions whenever
the IRS behaves unreasonably in pursuing the case. 94 Interpreting the Code
language broadly, 95 the court reaffirmed the provision's purpose to deter abusive
conduct and overreaching of the IRS.9 Permitting the IRS to escape attorney's
fee liability when it harasses a taxpayer at the administrative stage but alters
its position after the suit commences would frustrate the congressional purpose.97
Those federal district courts that have interpreted section 7430's "position
of the United States" language have applied similar reasoning. On parallel
facts, the court in Hallam v. Murphy9n tested the government's conduct throughout the entire tax proceeding, not merely subsequent to the suit's inception. 99
The government had continuously pursued an erroneous position; and had failed
to notify the taxpayers of the deficiency.' 0° The court found this position to be
per se unreasonable and granted the taxpayers' motion for costs and fees.""1
In Penner v. United States, 0 2 the government initiated a jeopardy assessment
against a taxpayer prior to trial. The District Court for the Southern District
03
of Florida responded by awarding the taxpayer reasonable litigation costs.'

Recognizing the dearth of legislative history underlying section 7430's enactment,' 0 4 the court indicated Congress could have dearly restricted fee-shifting

statutory notice of disallowance and the failure to receive such notice was not due to actions
of the party (such as the failure to supply requested information or a current mailing
address to the district director or service center having jurisdiction over the tax matter).
Id.
91. I.R.C. S 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1985).
92. Kaufinan, 758 F.2d at 3.
93. Id. at 4; see supra note 73.
94. TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 89, at S 15594.
95. The court reasoned that Congress' remedial bias in enacting I.R.C. § 7430 dictates the
inclusion of pre-litigation conduct. Kaufnan, 758 F.2d at 4.
96. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 3, at 11.
97. "Congress did not intend to dissuade taxpayers who, prior to filing a suit, were faced
with unreasonable conduct by the IRS." Kaujinan, 758 F.2d at 4.
98. 586 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
99. Id. at 3.
100, Id.
101.

The court considered the IRS' "continued assertion of a position with knowledge that

the position is based upon an erroneous assumption" to be per se unreasonable. Id.
102.

584 F. Supp. 1582 (S.D. Fla. 1984).

103. Id. at 1584.
104. Concluding the legislative history provided little guidance, the Penner court quoted a House
Conference Report accompanying TEFRA which stated "[t]he taxpayer may recover litigation costs
only if the position of the United States in the case was unreasonable." H.R. CONF. REP. No.
760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 686, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 1449. The
determinative issue was whether "case" referred only to litigation or to the entire tax matter.
Penner, 584 F. Supp. at 1584.,
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to situations of unreasonable trial posture."' 5 Absent such evidence of congressional intent, the court found no rational basis for distinguishing between the
6
government's administrative position and its trial position."'
Comparing the language and legislative histories of TEFRA and EAJA, one
federal district court concluded the addition of the administrative remedies requirement in TEFRA demonstrated a congressional intention to include prelitigation conduct within the scope of unreasonableness." 7 By defining the term
"civil proceeding" to include a civil action,'0 ' section 7430 implies that the
phrase covers more than just civil actions. 0 9 Otherwise, the IRS could assume
an unreasonable administrative position and abandon it before trial without fear
that the taxpayer would recover reasonable litigation expenses.,"'
2.

Litigation Position Theory

One circuit court"' and the balance of district courts diametrically opposed
to the Kaufman position propound an alternative interpretation of section 7430's
coverage. Significantly, the Tax Court has consistently confined its application
of "reasonableness" to the government's litigation posture." 2 In assuming the
"litigation" stance, these courts isolate the government's litigation position from
the underlying factual and procedural background of the case."'
In Eidson v. United States,' 4 the District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama denied a taxpayer's motion for fees upon a showing that the government had deferred a full refund of the amount claimed by the taxpayer until
trial." 5 The court predicated its decision on what it regarded as a dispositively
clear provision of the Code. ' ' 6 Specifically, the Eidson court equated the term
"civil proceeding" with actual litigation and denied any reference to the underlying administrative procedure." 7 The court echoed the taxpayer's concern
that the IRS should act reasonably both in litigation and in its underlying

105. Id. at 1584. The statute could have provided "the position of the United States in
presenting a defense in the civil proceeding." Id. at 1583.
106. Id. "If the Government's position in initiating the jeopardy assessment was found to be
unreasonable . . . , it is hard to fathom how the Government's position (in defending an unreasonable action) would be reasonable." Id.
107. Sharpe v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Va. 1984).
108. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
109. Sharpe v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 4, 8 (E.D. Va. 1984).
110. Id.
111. See infra notes 136-148 and accompanying text.
112. See Spritis v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 610 (1985); Powell v. Commissioner,
49 T.C.M. (CCH) 540 (1985); Popham v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 323 (1984); Baker
v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 822 (1984).
113. See Award of Attorneys Fees in Tax Cases: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures
of the House Comm. of Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1985) (referring to Moats v.
United States, 576 F. Supp. 1537, 1541 (W.D. Mo. 1984)).
9182 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
114. 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
115. Id. at 83,274.
116. The taxpayer must demonstrate the position of the IRS "in the civil proceeding" was
unreasonable. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1985).
117. Eidson, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 83,273.
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administration.' Nonetheless, the court held that an award of fees based on
the government's administrative position would contravene the explicit language
of section 7430.1"9
In addition to focusing on section 7430's express language, courts have
contrasted its legislative history with that of EAJA.' 20 The Tax Court demonstrated such an approach in Baker v. Commissioner. 2, The IRS assessed tax
deficiencies on a taxpayer based on its allowance of a foreign earned income
exclusion. The taxpayer pursued a protest and filed a petition.1 2 The IRS
conceded its error only after the taxpayer submitted information the IRS had
124
requested.' 23 After determining the government's pursuit was legally justified,
the court restricted the examination of reasonableness to the IRS's position
during the litigation.' 25 Like the court in Eidson, the Baker court narrowly con26
strued the term "civil proceeding" to denote the government's trial posture.
The court relied on section 7430's legislative history indicating that costs incurred during the administrative stages of a case were irrecoverable under an
award of fees.' 27 Finally, the court cited a series of cases under EAJA providing
some criteria for the determination of unreasonableness. 2
The Baker court substantiated its narrow construction of a "civil proceeding"

with a cursory reference to section 7430's legislative history. '29 However, the
House Committee discussion cited by the court addressed a different issue than
that faced by the court. The Committee report explains the potentially compensable costs in tax litigation.2 3 In particular, the reference suggests pre-lit-

118. Id. at 83,274.
119. Id.
120.
121.

See infra notes 186-187 and accompanying text.
83 T.C. 822 (Nov. 28, 1984).

122. Id. at 3853-54.
123. Id. at 3855.
124. Id. The substantive issue under I.R.C. S 911(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1985) was an issue
of first impression in the court. The IRS's position was thus not in conflict with other decisions.
83 T.C. 822, at 3857. The fact that the IRS required information regarding the taxpayer's statements as a prerequisite to conceding the case was not unreasonable. Id. at 3858. Se Greenberg
v. United States, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9257 (1983); Allen v. United States, 547 F. Supp.
357, 360 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (cases decided pursuant to EAJA).
125. Baker, 83 T.C. 822, at 3856.
126. Id. The court reasoned Congress distinguished a civil proceeding from an administrative
one by the exhaustion of remedies prerequisite to an award of fees and costs. See I.R.C. S 7430(b)(2)
(West Supp. 1985).
127. H.R. REp. No. 404, supra note 3, at 14.
128. See, e.g., Ashburn v. United States, 740 F.2d 843, 850 (11th Cir. 1984) (standard is one
of reasonableness which must be shown both in law and fact); Foster v. Tourtellotte, 704 F.2d
1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 1983) (court employed reasonableness standard); S & H Riggers & Erectors,
Inc. v. O.S.H.R.C., 672 F.2d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 1982) ("test of whether or not a government
action is substantially justified is essentially one of reasonableness").
129. Baker, 83 T.C. 822, at 3856.
130. "The committee intends that the costs of preparing and filing the petition or complaint
which commences a civil tax action be the first of any recoverable attorney's fees. Fees paid or
incurred for the services of an attorney during the administrative stages of the case could not be
recovered under an award of litigation costs." H.R. REp. No. 404, supra note 3, at 14.
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igation "costs" are not recoverable."' By contrast, the issue presently raised
is whether the government's unreasonable pre-litigation "conduct" can provide
the basis for an award of attorney's fees under section 7430.1' The compensability of pre-litigation costs is not disputed. The court's misinterpretation of
legislative history substantially attenuates Baker's precedential value. '
Neither Eidson nor Baker articulated a compelling basis for the restrictive
interpretation of the "position" of the IRS in an action or proceeding. Admittedly sympathizing with the plaintiff,'1 4 the Eidson court nevertheless summarily disposed of the conflict by interpreting an historically ambiguous phrase
in a circuitous manner. 3 5 The inconsistent decisions interpreting section 7430's
"in a civil proceeding" language refute the Eidson court's position that the
meaning of the phrase is self-evident.
The most recent decision to interpret the government's "position" under
section 7430 analogized the statute to EAJA and arrived at a more cogent
determination. In United States v. Balanced FinancialManagement,' 6 the government
attorney failed to attend a court-ordered hearing requiring the taxpayers to
show cause why they should not be held in contempt. 37 The district court
granted the taxpayers' motion to dismiss due to the government's failure to
prosecute properly."1 8 In addition, the court awarded attorney's fees and litigation costs pursuant to section 7430.39 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the award of fees. 1 41 ' The court held the attorney's absence did not
render the government's position in the underlying contempt proceeding unreasonable. 141
The court in Balanced Financial Management first acknowledged the functional
similarities between EAJA and section 7430.142 Reasoning that EAJA was not
intended to penalize the government for committing procedural defaults,"" the
court concluded the government's failure to attend the contempt hearing likewise
fell short of activating section 7430.' 44 In determining unreasonableness, the
131. Id.
132. See text accompanying note 5.
133. Specifically, the court read the legislative history to provide that IRS pre-litigation conduct
cannot trigger I.R.C. 5 7430. The court erred in such an interpretation since the language merely
indicated pre-litigation costs are not compensable under I.R.C. § 7430. Baker, 83 T.C. 822 (1984).
134. Eidson, 84-1 U.S. Tax Gas. (CCH) at 83,274.
135. The issue was whether the phrase, "in the civil proceeding," referred to the pre-litigation
or post-filing position of the United States. The court concluded that the use of "in the civil
proceeding" mandated the test of the "reasonableness of the government's position in the civil
proceeding, not the underlying administrative procedure." Id. at 83,273.
136. 769 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1985).
137. Id. at 1443.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1451. The court affirmed the dismissal of the contempt proceeding.
141. Id. at 1450-51.
142. The court stated the standards of "substantially justified" under EAJA and "unreasonable" under I.R.C. § 7430 were comparable. Id. at 1451 n.12.
143. Id. (citing McDonald v. Schweiker, 726 F.2d 311, 316 (7th Cir. 1983)).
144. The court held the attorney's absence from the hearing "does not render the institution
of the contempt proceedings or the Government's position in that underlying contempt proceeding
unreasonable." 769 F.2d at 1451.
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court confined its interpretation of "position" to the government's legal posture
45
in litigation.'
Balanced Financial Management is readily distinguishable from Eidson and Baker
inasmuch as the government's conduct lacked the reprehensibility of the conduct
in the latter cases. 146 The government's failure to attend the hearing was a
mere procedural default rather than a substantive error. Undertaking the con7
Given the
tempt proceeding was neither legally nor factually unreasonable.'
4
the Tenth Circuit relimited nature of the government's unreasonableness,
fused to grant the taxpayers' motion for fees.
B.

Equal Access to Justice Act

The Equal Access to Justice Act's provision for the award of attorney's fees
and litigation costs produced a judicial controversy parallel to that encountered
with section 7430. Courts interpreting the Act recognized the fundamental problem Congress created by failing to define "position.' 4 9 Circuits disagreed on
whether the term referred to the agency's underlying action or the government's
In 1984, Congress unanimously passed a bill proconduct in the litigation.'
longing EAJA's life and defining "position" to include the government's underlying administrative action.' 5' President Reagan, however, vetoed the
provision. 152 Unlike section 7430, EAJA provides for fee awards in any civil
145. Id. at 1450. The court concluded the Government's "position" meant "the arguments
relied upon by the Government in litigation." See United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef,
726 F.2d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 105 (1984).
146. See supra note 114-35 and accompanying text.
147. Balanced Fin. Mgmt., 769 F.2d at 1443, 1451 n.12.
148. Although the Government erred in failing to appear at the contempt proceeding, its
substantive position in commencing the contempt proceeding was not unreasonable. There was
presumably less "bad faith" on the part of the Government. Balanced Fin. Mgmt., 769 F.2d at
1451 n.12.

149. See Note, Reenacting the Equal Access to Justice Act: A Proposalfor Automatic Attorney's Fee
Awards, 94 YALE LJ. 1207, 1214-16 (1985) ("the most important area of disagreement that has
developed under the Act is an unanticipated split among the circuits as to what Congress meant

when it referred to the 'position' of the United States").
150. See, e.g., Keasler v. United States, 766 F.2d 1227, 1231 (8th Cir. 1985) (the "position"
of the United States encompasses the government's poiture at both the pre-litigation and litigation
stages); Timms v. United States, 742 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1984) ("the remedial purpose of
EAJA is best effectuated if we consider the totality of the circumstances present prior to and during
litigation" (citing Rawlings v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 1984))); Natural Resources
Defense Council v. U.S.E.P.A., 703 F.2d 700, 707 (3d Cir. 1983) (consistent with "its plain
meaning and the intention of Congress ... position refers to the agency action which made it
necessary for the party to file suit"). But see, e.g., Ashburn v. United States, 740 F.2d 843, 849
(11th Cir. 1984) (to avoid an automatic fee award, "interpreting 'position' as the government's
litigation position best implements the legislative compromise embodied in the EAJA"); Spencer
v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 552-53 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cet. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1908 (1984) (Congress
intended an "intermediate" standard for the award of fees with a view toward the agency's litigation
position); Tyler Business Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1982) ("position" means
government's posture in defending litigation).
151. H.R. 5479, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CoNG. REC. S 14387 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
152. 20 WEEKLY COMP. oF Pgms. Doc. 1814 (Nov. 1984). The President vetoed the provision
because congress. included the 'underlying agency action within the definition of "position." See
Equal Access Reauthorization Pocket Vetoed by President, 42 CONG.
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litigation.' 5 Like its successor, EAJA fosters uncertainty in fee-shifting where
the government's conduct is nonmeritorious.
1.

Underlying Action Theory

Case law defining the government's "position" as encompassing the agency
action necessitating a lawsuit generally relied on supportive legislative history.'A
For instance, the Senate Report explicitly conferred "prevailing party" status
on the beneficiary of a settlement. 155 Courts determined that Congress' reference
to settlement clearly indicated the word "position" encompassed both the IRS's
administrative and litigation behavior." 6 In addition, the Senate Report suggested the underlying administrative actions should be examined in prescribing
7
fee awards."
Floor discussion clarified congressional understanding of the government's
"position." Debate concerning actionable conduct was replete with references
to governmental action, 5 s capricious and arbitrary federal regulation,'"9 and
irresponsible bureaucratic behavior. 6" Senator Nelson articulated EAJA's salutary effects as twofold: redressing the victims of government wrongdoing, and
restraining insensitive, arbitrary or irresponsible regulators.' 6 ' Restricting the
Act to the government's litigation position and ignoring the administrative action
that compelled the lawsuit would remove the very incentive Congress furnished. 62 Moreover, the Act defines the "United States" as including all agencies and officials of the government acting in their official capacities."' This
definition, encompassing administrative agencies, clearly supports the underlying
action theory.
Britton v. United States 64 illustrates the underlying action doctrine's expansive
definition of "position." In Britton, the IRS imposed an assessment for unpaid

153. 28 U.S.C. S 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982); see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
154. See Keasler v. United States, 766 F.2d 1227, 1231 (8th Cir. 1985); Natural Resources
Defense Council v. U.S.E.P.A., 703 F.2d 700, 707-12 (3d Cir. 1983); Citizens Coal. for Block
Grant Compliance v. City of Euclid, 717 F.2d 964, 966 (6th Cir. 1983).
155. S. REP. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEws 4984, 4990.
156. Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S.E.P.A., 703 F.2d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 1983)
("The reference to settlements makes plain that 'position of the United States' must have been
meant to include not only the litigation position, which will more often than not be determined
by the Justice Department, but also the agency position which made the lawsuit necessary.").
157. S. REP. No. 253, supr note 156, at 15, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEws
4984, 4993.
158. 125 CONG. REC. S 10914 (daily ed. July 31, 1979) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
159. Id. at S 10916 (statement by Sen. DeConcini) ("the purpose is to readjust the position
between the Government acting in its regulatory capacity and individual rights").
160. Id. at S 10917 (statement by Sen. Thurmond) ("the implicit assumption in the approach
taken by this legislation is that affecting the 'pocketbook' of the agency is the most direct way to
assure more responsible bureaucratic behavior").
161. Id. at S 10922.
162. Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S.E.P.A., 703 F.2d 700, 710 (3d Cir. 1983).
163. 28 U.S.C. S 2412(d)(2)(c) (1982).
164. 587 F. Supp. 834 (W D. Mo. 1984).
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withholding taxes on a company's bookkeeper. 65 Rather than consider evidence
that the bookkeeper was not legally responsible, 66 the IRS threatened litigation
unless the taxes were paid. 167 The bookkeeper paid the amount and initiated
a refund action.'68 The IRS learned of its mistake69 through discovery and granted
the plaintiff bookkeeper a complete settlement.
Reasoning the IRS never held information indicating the plaintiff was an
officer responsible for payment of taxes, 170 the Britton court awarded attorney's
fees and litigation costs.'7 ' The court justified its decision in part on the gov72
ernment's failure to apprise the plaintiff of the proposed assessment and lien.
In addition, the court deemed the government's repeated disregard of determinative evidence at each administrative stage a classic example of indifference
and unreasonableness.' 7 To have meaning, a fee award must recompense innocent prevailing taxpayers who are forced into court.
2.

Litigation Position Theory

Despite apparent congressional support for awards based on IRS pre-litigation conduct, 74 several courts have endorsed the litigation position theory. 7 5
Recognizing that EAJA fails to explicate the word "position," 1 76 litigation theory
proponents attempt to neutralize the Act's definition of the "United States"
with an alternative, though similarly indirect, provision of EAJA.177 Section
2412(d)(3) of EAJA instructs a court reviewing administrative agencies' adversary adjudications to award fees unless the position of the United States can
be substantially justified or circumstances make fee-shifting unjust.'7 M Courts
advocating the litigation position doctrine presume the "position" of the United
States refers to its litigation posture before the agency.'"
165. Id. at 835.
166. Id. The bookkeeper offered a notorized letter to the IRS revenue officer. The letter, from
the company's president, clearly stated the plaintiff was not a corporate officer and that the president
was responsible for the taxes. The IRS refused to investigate the matter. Id.
167. Id. at 836.
168. Id.
169. Id. The IRS unduly delayed both the settlement negotiations and the eventual disbursement of a refund check. Id.
170. Id. at 838.
171. Id. at 840.
172. Id. "Instead, the gears of bureaucracy creaked into motion without warning, and plaintiff
became grist for the IRS mill." Id.
173. Id. at 839. Upon learning of the assessment and lien, the plaintiff diligently approached
the IRS with evidence that he was not responsible for the taxes. Id.
174. See supra notes 154-73 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 150; see, e.g., Gava v. United States, 699 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Broad Ave. Laundry & Tailoring v. United States, 693 F.2d 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1982); Alspach v.
District Director of Internal Revenue, 527 F. Supp. 225 (D. Md. 1981).

176. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S.E.P.A., 703 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir. 1983);
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984).
Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
177. Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1908
(1984).
178. 28 U.S.C. S 2412(d)(3) (1982).
179. Ashburn v. United States, 740 F.2d 843, 848 (11th Cir. 1984); Spencer v. NLRB, 712
F.2d 539, 547-48 (D.C.Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1908 (1984).
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Like the underlying action proponents, litigation position advocates obtain
support from EAJA's legislative history. 80 Committee reports describe the standard of liability in terms of the government's ability to substantiate "its case"
legally and factually.'' Additionally, congressional debates make reference to
the IRS's unreasonableness "in pursuing the litigation"' 82 and in "its decision
to litigate.' 8 21 Finally, Congress expressed fear over the exorbitant costs associated with an automatic fee-shifting provision. 84 Consistent with the intermediate "substantial justification" standard, some courts contend Congress
5
intended the litigation position theory for EAJA."
C.

Interaction of L R. C. § 7430 and EAJA

The evolution of case law under EAJA and section 7430 reveals a judicial
impasse with regard to the awarding of fees. The respective legislative histories
fail to provide a clear-cut view. In reviewing section 7430 in light of EAJA
policy and precedent, most courts underscore similarities between the acts and
incorporate EAJA's legislative history. 8 6 This practice, undertaken because of
the comparatively sparse legislative history behind section 7430, has further
confused the interpretation of section 7430. Some jurisdictions distinguish EAJA's provision to effectuate a particular result. 87 The balance of courts analyze
the enactments without reciprocal reference. 8 Given the trend for independent
review in some circuits, the likelihood of consistent judicial resolution of the
underlying action/litigation position dichotomy is remote.

180. See Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 547-53 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct.
1908 (1984).
181. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980) S. REP. No. 253, supra note 155,
at 6.
182. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 181, at 11; S. REP. No. 253, supra note 155, at 6-7.
183. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 181, at 11; S. REP. No. 253, supra note 155, at 6-7.
184. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 181, at 6.
185. See, e.g., Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 551 (D.C.Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1908 (1984). "This standard balances the constitutional obligation of the executive branch to see
that the laws are faithfully executed against the public interest in encouraging parties to vindicate
their rights." H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 181, at 10; S. REP. No. 253, supra note 155, at
6, reprinted
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 4953, 4989.
186. See, e.g., United States v. Balanced Fin. Mgmt., 769 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1985); Brazil
v. United States, 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) J 9596 (D. Ore. 1984); Sharpe v. United States,
607 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Va. 1984); Baker v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 822 (1984); Popham v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 323 (1984); see also Note, supra note 28, at 480-83 ("Many of the
conclusions regarding the EAJA, however, are applicable to section 7430 and thus many of the
precedents scrutinized in the analysis of TEFRA below are derived from EAJA case law.").
187. See, e.g., Zielinski v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 5 9514 (D. Minn. 1984);
Sharpe v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Va. 1984); Eidson v. United States, 84-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH)
9182 (N.D. Ala. 1984); Popham v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. 323 (1984).
188. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985); Contini v. United States, 842 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9969 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Penner v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1582
(S.D. Fla. 1984); Hallam v. Murphy, 586 F. Supp. I (N.D. Ga. 1983); Spirtis v. Commissioner,
49 T.C.M. (CCH) 611 (1985); Powell v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 611 (1985); Powell
v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 540 (1985).
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V.

ADOPTING THE UNDERLYING

ACTION DOCTRINE

Due to disparate interpretations of the phrase "position in a civil proceeding," section 7430's effect on attorney's fee recovery has proven negligi-

ble.'9 The underlying action theory for the award of attorney's fees and litigation
costs serves remedial and deterrent purposes which are fundamental to any
system of fee-shifting.19° The equity and fairness advanced under such a system
may be achieved at minimal cost to the government.
Courts adopting the litigation position make an arbitrary distinction by ex9
tricating the IRS's litigation position from the factual background of a case.' '

Limiting the examination of unreasonableness to the government's litigation
position undermines the idea of a fee incentive.' 92 Because taxpayers cannot
anticipate the IRS's legal arguments, their ability to assess the likelihood of a
fee award is substantially impaired.' 93 The superior resources of the IRS further
magnifies the imbalance between the parties. 94 By adopting the underlying
action form of fee-shifting, Congress could prevent the disproportionate advantage otherwise accorded the IRS in tax litigation.' 95
Litigation expenses often impede a taxpayer from suing the IRS on a meritorious claim.' 96 The taxpayer's cost frequently transcends any benefits obtained
from litigation.' 97 Due to these economic risks, taxpayers do not casually undertake a section 7430 motion for litigation costs. Congress attempted to remedy
the financial injury by providing fee awards to victims of indefensible governmental conduct. 98 Taxpayers otherwise unable to afford litigation expenses gain
an opportunity to challenge unjustified IRS conduct.
Equally important to the remedial purpose underpinning section 7430 is the
deterrent effect on unreasonable IRS behavior. Adopting the litigation position

189.

From February 28, 1983 through April 15, 1985; I.R.C. 5 7430 yielded 20 awards totaling

$140,734. See Award of Attorneys Fees in Tax Cases: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures
of the House Comm. of Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (April 25, 1985).
190. See generally Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shfting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DuKE
L.J. 651, 653-66 (1982) (specific rationales to justify fee-shifting include fairness and indemnity,
compensation for legal injury, punitive fee-shifting, private attorney general theory, effect on the
parties' relative strengths, and general economic incentives).
191. Moats v. United States, 576 F. Supp. 1537, 1541 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
192. See Note, supra note 149, at 1214.
193. See Moholland v. Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D.N.H. 1982) (the decision to
pursue litigation "is made prior to the action, and therefore will not be swayed by the potential
that the government might not comport itself with proper adversarial etiquette").
194. Se Rowe, supra note 190, at 664.
195. Id.; see also DeConcini, Equal Access to Justice, 2:6 FED. Ar-rv. FEE AWARDs REP. 3-4 (Oct.
1979) (in addition to balancing party strengths, fee-shifting themes include "making whole those
who have been the victims of unreasonable government action," encouraging resistance to unreasonable government action, generating public law precedent, and deterring agencies from vexatious
litigation).
196. See Note, supra note 29, at 154 n.5. ("The extensive resources and personnel of government agencies render the decisions of these bodies almost impervious to challenge by the common
citizen unless that individual is benefited by statutory provisions which help to ensure each person
a day in court for the adjudication of appropriate complaints.").
197. Supra note 189, at 63 ("[i]t was this wrong that Congress intended to make right").
198. Id.
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theory insulates the IRS from fee awards and offers no incentive to act reasonably. ' 99 Rather than resolve disputes through negotiation and settlement,
taxpayers are compelled to file complaints at the earliest opportunity. After
forcing taxpayers to litigate, the IRS can concede and effectively minimize its
exposure to damage awards. Such circumvention of section 7430 emasculates
the purposes Congress articulated in enacting TEFRA.2 00 The underlying action
theory precludes such a result by refusing to ignore unreasonable IRS conduct
at earlier stages.
Supporting the litigation position doctrine, the Department of Justice and
IRS argue that limiting the review of reasonableness to the facts and arguments
before the court will conserve judicial resources. 20 1 The IRS further contends
it must assume a position in many cases before the taxpayer provides all available facts and documentation. 20 2 Pre-litigation proponents respond by providing
a mediatory definition of "position" referring to the last agency position creating
the right to seek legal redress.2 1" This modified underlying action approach
alleviates the problem of reviewing every regulatory decision and administrative
211 4
memorandum placed in agency files.
The Department of Justice has suggested that testing reasonableness in the
context of the litigation position serves to encourage settlement.2 0 1 Presumably,
the government is more receptive to settlement when the issue of attorney's
fees is presented in the case in chief. 20 6 Contrary evidence indicates the IRS
engages in indirect intimidation to limit the taxpayer's use of section 7430.207
According to the United States Attorney, the government refuses to negotiate
a settlement absent the taxpayer's waiver of his right to move for fees under
211
the Code. 8

199. Id. at 64; see also Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S.E.P.A., 703 F.2d 700, 70607 (3rd Cir. 1983) (limiting the focus to the government's litigation position "means that no matter
how outrageously improper the agency action has been, and no matter how intransigently a wrong
position has been maintained prior to the litigation, and no matter how often the same agency
repeats the offending conduct, the statute has no application, so long as employees of the Justice
Department act reasonably when they appear before the court").
200. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 189, at 30, 33 (statement by Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General, Tax Division, Department of Justice) ("The court has merely to look and review the
facts and arguments that are made in the case before it, whereas if it had to consider the IRS's
[sic] conduct which was not subject to the trial, it would, in effect, have to conduct another trial
on that issue.").
202. Id. at 15, 19 (statement by Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
203. Id. at 37, 40 (statement by Frank S. Swain, Chief Advocacy Counsel for Small Business
Administration) ("look at what happened before the actual lawsuit, but with proper limits on
discovery").
204.

See id. at 37.

205. Id. at 30-31.
206. Id. at 33 (Giatement by Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division,
Department of Justice) ("Obviously the government will be more likely to settle a case if it can
dispose of the case without having to litigate the merits in an attorney's fee proceeding.").
207. Id. at 64-65.
208. Id.
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Section 7430 contains a sunset provision mandating its expiration on December 31, 1985.209 Senator Baucus has introduced a bill which prolongs the
section's existence and makes it applicable to the government's pre-litigation
conduct.2 10 Such a revision would be preferable to section 7430's extension
absent a resolution of the dispute or its otherwise ineluctable termination. In
the alternative, a modified underlying action approach defining "position" as
including the final administrative posture would ultimately prove less objectionable.
VI.

CONCLUSION

A bureaucratic monolith such as the IRS should not be granted unbridled
administrative authority in collecting federal tax revenue. When capricious government conduct forces a taxpayer into the legal system for redress, and the
government subsequently concedes its position or the taxpayer substantially prevails, the taxpayer should be recompensed for his legal expenses. On balance,
legislative adoption of the underlying action doctrine for section 7430 represents
the most equitable and administratively feasible solution. Taxpayers victimized
by the government's unreasonable conduct at any stage could be made whole
by the award of reasonable litigation costs and attorney's fees. Agencies would
be discouraged from engaging in vexatious administrative harassment. The IRS
could no longer circumvent the statutory provision for fees by reversing its
unwarranted conduct at the filing of the petition. Finally, economic considerations would effectively confine section 7430 motions to the few instances of
truly outrageous IRS conduct.
PHILLIP

S.

DINGLE

209. I.R.C. S 7430(0 (West Supp. 1985) provides: "() Termination-This section shall not apply
to any proceeding commenced after December 31, 1985.
210. S. 1513, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985) (the amendments provided in the bill include:
removing the $25,000 limitation in favor of the EAJA limits on attorneys' hourly fees; replacing
the "unreasonableness" standard with the "substantially justified" standard; mandating the standard
be applicable to pre-litigation actions of government agents; and shifting the burden of proof from
the taxpayer to the government).
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